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I. Introduction: You Can Run But You Can't Hide
... Your Phone Brings the Police Along For the Ride
If Scott Peterson had been stuck in traffic on a congested
highway in Los Angeles, driven to a local bank, or taken a
transcontinental road trip to West Orange, New Jersey, police in
Modesto, California would have known. Indeed, the police
department's surveillance was precise, perpetual, and nearly
invisible. It was also electronic. Shortly after Peterson's wife,
Laci, disappeared in December 2002, police in Modesto, California
secretly placed Global Positioning System ("GPS") tracking units
on four of his vehicles.2 Peterson, who has since been convicted of
killing his wife, did not know his every move was being recorded
by an electronic device and his actions were providing evidence of
his guilt.3 Specifically, Peterson repeatedly 4 visited a marina on
the San Francisco Bay, in what prosecutors alleged was an effort to
make sure that his wife's body had not surfaced.5 While we cannot
be sure whether Peterson would have been convicted if not for the
GPS evidence, one thing is certain: Law enforcement officers6 are
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2006.
2 Rusty Dornin, Judge Allows GPS Evidence in Peterson Case, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/17/peterson.trial/ (Feb. 17, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
3 Brendan Koerner, Spy Games: From Black Boxes to GPS Devices, Your Car
Is Recording Your Every Move, READER'S DIGEST, July 2004, at 83-84.
4 Id. at 84 ("The data... show Peterson... paying five visits to the California
marina where... [Laci's] body was eventually discovered following her
Christmas Eve 2002 disappearance.").
5 See Dornin, supra note 2.
6 This paper uses the terms "law enforcement officers" (or "police officers") and
"government agents" interchangeably. This is not done for the sake of variety
constantly employing new, more effective means of tracking their
suspects, and the rapid technological developments that
characterize American society fuel their efforts.
There is no doubt that technological advances have the
power to make our lives easier. This fact is particularly true with
regard to travel as devices such as cellular phones, electronic toll-
collection systems, and GPS navigators make road trips quicker
and more enjoyable or reduce the chances that we will get lost. As
the public embraces them wholeheartedly, these products have
become ingrained into the American way of life. For instance, the
Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, a
Washington, D.C. organization, estimates that there are now 165.7
million cellular phone users in America. 7 Additionally, OnStar, a
GPS and cellular technology hybrid that incorporates security,
safety, and technology features, now boasts 2.5 million
subscribers. 8 Finally, E-ZPass, an electronic toll collection system
used throughout the Northeast, claims more than 1.2 million users
in New Jersey alone. 9 In fact, E-ZPass has become so successful
that clones have sprung up in other areas of the country. 10 While
but, rather, in recognition of the fact that the Fourth Amendment protects people
from federal-, state-, and local-level officials.
7 Julian Bauer, Cutting the Cord; Twenty-Somethings Disconnect From
Traditional Phone Service and Go Wireless, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 8,
2004, at El.
8OnStar Corp., General Motors' OnStar Subsidiary Partners with the National
Center for Missing & Exploited Children, at
www.onstargm.com/promo/html/pressreleasencmec.html (Apr. 21, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
9 Athena D. Merritt, NJ Notes Improvements with E-Zpass, at
http://Philadelphia.bizjournals.com/Philadelphia/stories/2004/07/12/dailyl 
.htm
1 (July 13, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
10 See, e.g., Susan Franke, Toll Tags Speed Traffic Through Booths and Maybe
Drive-through Lanes, Too, at
http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2002/02/04/focus2.html (Feb. 1,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Kansas'
electronic toll collection system, known as "K-Tag," launched in 1995 and
boasted nearly 140,000 subscribers by 2002; FasTrack, Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://www.511.org/fastrak/faq.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). FasTrack is an
electronic toll-collection system used throughout California's Bay Area.
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these products make our travels more convenient, each comes with
a hidden feature: The government gets to tag along. Indeed, when
using a cellular phone, an electronic toll-collection transponder, or
an in-car GPS navigator, millions of consumers are unwittingly
opening themselves up to multiple forms of government tracking,
all of which they pay for and none of which is sufficiently
restricted by law.
This Comment examines the means by which law
enforcement officials can use an individual's technology against
him, focusing on how the government can track people who use
certain commercially available products and the laws meant to
regulate such conduct. Part II highlights various products that the
government can and has used to track people. Part III examines
the judiciary's efforts to regulate such conduct and details how the
laws we currently depend on to safeguard us from government
surveillance actually provide little or no protection. Part IV
proposes ways in which the courts might counter this electronic
invasion of privacy.
II. How do I Track Thee... Let Me Count the Ways
The American business world is characterized by a healthy
spirit of competition. Technological advances continually drive
companies to improve their goods and delve into new areas of
research in order to avoid being outdone by rival corporations.
Indeed, the last decade has been rife with such development,
particularly with regard to products that make our hectic lives more
manageable." Items such as cellular phones, E-ZPass
transponders, and navigation tools utilizing the GPS allow us to
work and travel more efficiently than ever before. However, all of
these technologies necessarily involve the collection and
transmission of their users' personal information and contribute to
what two authors term the growing American "surveillance
1 "Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The
Growth of an American Surveillance Society, at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfmn?ID=l 1573&c=39 (Jan. 15, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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monster. ' ' 12 Additionally, with increasing frequency, federal and
state officials are forcing private companies to surrender their
customers' personal data for investigatory purposes.' 3
Specifically, law enforcement agencies throughout the country
have used the data generated by cellular phones, GPS devices, and
other consumer-owned products to track suspects.
While cellular phones are powerful communication tools,
they are not traditional tracking devices. Currently, there are two
different ways of locating particular cellular phones and, in turn,
their owners. 14 The first method is known as "Enhanced 911"
("E91 1") technology, which allows emergency personnel to locate
a 911 caller anywhere in the country by virtue of a GPS device
contained in that caller's cellular phone. 15 The Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") has issued a regulation
requiring that all new cellular phones activated since December 31,
2002 include E9 11 technology. 16 Moreover, the FCC requires that
service providers gradually phase out their support of phones not
equipped with E9 11 technology so that ninety-five percent of
cellular phone subscribers will be using E9 11-capable phones by
December 31, 2005. 17 Finally, the FCC requires that the tracking
technology included in cellular phones be powerful enough to
track subscribers with a high degree of accuracy and reliability.' 8
12 Id.
13 American Civil Liberties Union, Emerging "Surveillance-Industrial
Complex" Is Turbo-Charging Government Monitoring, ACLU Warns in New
Report, at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfn?ID= 1 6229&c= 130 (Aug. 9,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
14 Aaron Futch & Christine Soares, Enhanced 911 Technology and Privacy
Concerns: How Was the Balance Changed Since September 11? 2001 DUKE L.
& TECH. REv. 38, 4 at
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0038.html (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
15 id.
16 FCC Common Carrier Services: Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 47
C.F.R. § 20.18 (g)(1)(iv) (1996).
17 See id. § 20.18 (g)(1)(v).
18 See id § 20.18 (h) (stating "[1]icensees subject to this section shall comply
with the following standards for. .. location accuracy and reliability .... For
handset-based technologies: 50 meters for 67 percent of calls, 150 meters for 95
percent of calls.").
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Indeed, should the government choose to employ them, E911
systems provide a direct way of tracking any member of the
escalating cellular phone user population.
The second, and slightly more indirect and imprecise,
method of tracking cellular phone users is known as
triangulation. 19 This process involves estimating a caller's location
based on the relative positions of the different cellular receiving
towers that carried the signals from his phone. 20 In United States
v. Forest,2 1 agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") used signal triangulation, without first obtaining a search
warrant, to locate defendant Herman Garner, a suspected cocaine
trafficker.22 DEA officers suspected that Garner was involved in a
cocaine trafficking operation, and officers physically followed
Garner and observed his activities. 23 However, when the DEA
agents were unable to maintain their visual contact with Garner,
a DEA agent dialed Garner's cellular phone several
times (without allowing it to ring).., and used
Sprint's computer data to determine which cellular
transmission towers were being "hit" by Garner's
phone. This "cell-site data" revealed the general
location of Garner. From this data, DEA agents
determined that Garner had traveled to the
Cleveland area and then returned to the area of
24Youngstown/Warren.
Using the information gained by triangulating Garner's cellular
phone signals, the DEA agents were able to reestablish visual
contact with Garner and arrest him.2 5 Indeed, while signal
triangulation does not yield location data as precise as that
generated by the GPS-driven E91 1 systems discussed above, it is
still a powerful tracking tool; just ask Herman Garner.
19 Futch & Soares, supra note 14, 4.
20 id.
21 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
22 Id. at 947.
23 id.
24 id.
25 Id. at 947-48.
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Cellular phones are not the only technology capable of
giving the government direct information regarding users'
whereabouts. Electronic toll collection ("ETC") devices, such as
26E-ZPass, may also be used for this purpose. To use this
technology, drivers attach a transponder to their vehicles.27 As
drivers pass through specially equipped toll plazas, the transponder
sends information to a receiver in the toll plaza, and the toll is then
debited from the driver's pre-paid account.28 While E-ZPass
makes commuting both faster and easier, it does the same for
government surveillance. For billing purposes, ETC service
providers keep a log of where and when each of its customers
passes through a participating toll plaza. Therefore, a law
enforcement agency looking to track an ETC subscriber need only
check an individual's account information in order to get at least a
basic idea of his location. Additionally, more secretive
government uses of the technology have been revealed.
"Unbeknownst to most E-ZPass subscribers, antennas placed along
twenty miles of the New York State Thruway and the New Jersey
Turnpike have been quietly picking up their I.D. numbers and
clocking their speed and location. 29 While it seems clear that the
information collected by ETC systems could be used to track those
using the convenient technology, such data would present little
threat if subscribers' personal information were kept confidential.
However, in New York City, where ETC systems are ingrained in
the city's mass-transportation system, courts have not stopped
police officers from seizing subscriber records from the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA").3O
26 E-ZPass New Jersey Customer Service Center, About E-ZPass FAQs, at
http://www.ezpass.com/static/faq/index.shtml (Sept. 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). E-ZPass is currently used in
New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and
West Virginia. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Norman Vanamee, E-Z Does It, at
http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/travel/features/2182/ (Feb. 8, 1998) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).3 0 Brendan Koerner, Your Cellphone is a Homing Device, LEGAL AFF. at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-
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As New York City allows travelers to use both E-ZPass and
the MetroCard, which provides users with a convenient way of
paying subway fares, technology has made life easier for the city's
residents and tourists alike. 31 Ease comes with a price, however, as
the MTA's central computers collect the data generated by these
systems, providing government authorities with a potentially
infinite number of tracking opportunities. 32 Moreover, since the
MTA's 1997 attempt to shield subscriber information from the
warrantless searches of government authorities failed, "[a] mere
request [by police] seems sufficient for the MTA to fork over the
data.",33 Therefore, whether or not those using New York City's
mass-transportation systems realize it, their travels leave an
electronic trail accessible by any requesting police officer.
While ETC systems allow government agents to track
travelers, the locating power of such technology pales in
comparison to that of the GPS. The GPS is "a constellation of
satellites that transmit timed coded pulses, like a radio tower
transmitting radio pulses. Just as a phone is used to access the
telephone system ... a GPS receiver is used to 'tune into' the
satellite pulses." 34 GPS receivers then process this data in order to
"produce an accurate progressive record of location and time, and
[this record] can have the same persuasive courtroom clout as
DNA evidence." 35 While the GPS makes it much easier for
2003/feature koernerjulaug03.html (July-Aug. 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
31 See People v. Webb, 709 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (2000), overruled by People v.
Smith, 739 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (2002). The court stated,
The MetroCard is a magnetically encoded fare pass, which is
used to gain entrance to the subway. There are two general
types of MetroCard: the "value-based" pass, which is
assigned a dollar value, and the "time-based" pass, which may
be used for an unlimited number of rides during a specified
time period.
Id.
32 See Koerner, supra note 30 (providing that the MTA computers record
passengers' station and entry time).
33 Id,
34 David A. Schumann, Tracking Evidence With GPS Technology, 77 WIS.
LAW. 9, 10 (2004).
35 id.
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motorists to find their way, it also makes it easier for government
agents to find those motorists.
The proliferation of GPS technology, particularly that used
in subscription-based services such as OnStar, provides
government authorities with convenient databases from which to
gather information regarding users' movements. OnStar and
similar services involve a technology known as "telematics,"
which "combines wireless voice and data communications with in-
vehicle navigation to deliver location-specific information,
security, and productivity-enhancing services for people on the
move." 36 Considering the powerful nature of the GPS, government
actors are easily able to track subscribers when they access the data
of companies providing telematics services. Additionally, by
virtue of the voice communication feature of telematics systems,
authorities have actually been able to "listen to oral
communications within the car."37 In The Company v. United
States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the legality of such practices as long as they are conducted
"'unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the
services that such service provider ... is according the person
whose communications are to be intercepted.' 38 While
government agents have thus far obtained warrants before tapping
into subscribers' oral communications, 39 there is no indication such
a procedure is legally mandated.
36 Ron Schneiderman, The Digital Car: Shifting into High Gear, at
http://www.ce.org/publications/vision!2001/sepoct/pl 1 .asp (Sept.-Oct. 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
37 The Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that the Federal Bureau of Investigation used a telematics system as
a "roving bug" and listened to conversations taking place in a subscriber's car).
38Id. at 1144 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2001)).
39Id. at 1134 ("The Federal Bureau of Investigation... sought and obtained a
series of court orders requiring the Company to assist in intercepting
conversations taking place in a car equipped with the System.").
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III. Can They Really Get Away With That? Judicial
Protections (or Lack Thereof) Against Government
Tracking
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution4
is at the very core of adjudication involving impermissible
violations of an individual's privacy by government agents.
Therefore any discussion of government tracking must begin with
an examination of the Fourth Amendment's provisions. The
amendment created "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.' While the Fourth Amendment's protections
originally extended only to illegal searches by federal officials, the
Fourteenth Amendment 42 applied these safeguards against state
actors as well.43 Though the language of the Fourth Amendment is
very broad, the United States Supreme Court has limited its
protections by interpreting the provision quite narrowly.
Katz v. United States44 provides the seminal interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment's safeguards.45 However, it was not the
majority's opinion in Katz, but rather Justice John Harlan's
concurrence, that supplied this analysis. Justice Harlan explained
40 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41 id
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the
concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause."), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55
(1961). Though the Mapp Court overruled Wolf's holding that improperly
seized evidence was admissible in state judicial proceedings, the Court
embraced the Wolfprinciple that the Fourth Amendment applied against state
actors by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding, "[t]oday we once again
examine Wolf s constitutional documentation of the right to privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and.., are led by it to close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant
abuse of that basic ight .... ." Id.
44 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
45 See, e.g., United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999)
(referring to the rule advanced by Justice Harlan in his Katz concurrence as "the
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis").
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that an individual benefits from the Fourth Amendment's
protections only when that person has "exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable." 46 Consistent with this reasoning, the Court has held
that "private residences are places in which the individual normally
expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared
to recognize as justifiable. 47 Indeed, the Court declared,
"searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. 48
While the Court has traditionally afforded the home such
protections, it has generally refused to apply the Fourth
Amendment's provisions to law enforcement activities outside of
the domestic setting.
Obviously, if people were to remain in their homes at all
times, the government would have little need for tracking
technology. However, with the abundance of automobiles and
other methods of transportation, America is arguably the most
mobile society of all time.49 Although Americans spend so much
time in transit, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Knotts50 emphasized that, at least with regard to their physical
location, people enjoy very little Fourth Amendment protection
while driving in public. In Knotts, law enforcement officers
suspected that Tristan Armstrong was purchasing chloroform in
order to make illegal drugs.51 Acting without a warrant, they
46 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (creating what has come to
be known as the "reasonable expectation of privacy standard").
47 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
48 Id. at 714-15 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984);
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
49 See Rep. Nick Rahall & Rep. Tom Petri, Reauthorization of the
Transportation Equity Act of the 21st Century; Investment Vital to American
Roads, ROLL CALL (May 5, 2003), available at 2003 WL 7690609, 3 ("[T]he
American people are the most mobile society in history .... [T]oday you can
make a transcontinental journey by car in a matter of days.") (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
50 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
51 Id. at 278.
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placed a tracking device 52 inside a container of chloroform
manufactured by Hawkins Chemical Company and arranged for
the company to sell Armstrong that specific container.53 Though
the officers were unable to maintain visual surveillance of the
container, they followed the signal produced by the on-board
tracking device and eventually located the chloroform canister at a
remote cabin.54 After obtaining a search warrant, the police
searched the cabin and discovered a methamphetamine lab.55
Although the defendants contended the officers' warrantless use of
a tracking device constituted an improper "search" under the
Fourth Amendment, this argument was rejected at trial.56 The case
advanced to the Supreme Court where the majority held that "a
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another." 57 In short, because the defendants had no
reasonable expectation of privacy, the officers' activities did not
constitute an illegal search.
Although Knotts was decided over two decades ago and the
tracking technology at issue in the case was not nearly as
sophisticated as that which is available today, the Supreme Court's
decision remains binding law. Moreover, as the general principals
drawn from that case have subsequently been applied to
contemporary tracking devices, 5 8 it is important to recognize the
practical effects that Knotts and its progeny have had on privacy
law.
52 Id. at 277 (explaining that the transmitter was called a "beeper" and was "a
radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can
be picked up by a radio receiver.").531 d. at 278.
5 4 id.
55 Id. at 279.
56 See id. ("After his motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless
monitoring of the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted for conspiring to
manufacture controlled substances .... .").
57 See id. at 281. See also United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 759 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) ("As one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning
an act performed within the visual range of a complete stranger, the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement was not implicated.").
58 See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2004)
(applying the Knotts standard to tracking involving a cellular telephone).
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A. What Constitutes a "Search" Under the Fourth
Amendment?
The Fourth Amendment's protections do not take effect
unless a government agent has conducted either an improper
search or seizure. The Supreme Court, using the standard
developed in Katz, holds that "a Fourth Amendment search occurs
when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable." 59 As discussed above,
government agents are unlikely to attempt to track individuals
within their own homes. Moreover, such surveillance would
clearly invoke the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment6° as long
as that individual's location within the house was not within plain
view of the public. 61 There is nothing, however, to keep law
enforcement officers from tracking people in public areas, where
courts have traditionally held that a person does not have a
"reasonable" expectation of privacy.62 As courts hold that such
tracking does not constitute a search at all, they effectively move
electronic tracking outside of the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
Essentially, these decisions gave law enforcement agencies the
authority to track whomever they wish, without counterbalancing
this power by requiring government agents to justify their actions
to a neutral magistrate.
B. The Super-Human Senses of Law Enforcement
Officials
Individuals in the public sphere do not enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding their location because,
9 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
60 Id. at 40 ("We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the
entrance to the house."') (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980)).
61 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) ("The Fourth Amendment
protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.").
62 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another.").
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theoretically, they may always be seen by someone.63 Courts have
generally equated law enforcement's use of electronic tracking
devices with visual surveillance, a practice that government agents
are clearly authorized to conduct.64 Moreover, most courts agree
that while government actors are actually using these tracking
devices as a substitute for visual surveillance, the situation is akin
to one in which an officer is merely using technology to augment
his natural senses, as if he were using a flashlight or a pair of
binoculars rather than a GPS locator. 65 This argument essentially
relies on the legal fiction that electronic tracking devices do not
function on their own but instead imbue law enforcement officials
with the super-human ability to conduct continuous visual
surveillance on an individual for a potentially infinite time period.
IV. Long-Term Changes, Short-Term Fixes, and the Future
of Privacy Law
Under the Supreme Court's current interpretation, the
Fourth Amendment places no substantial restrictions on the ability
of law enforcement officials to track people electronically. In fact,
as discussed above, the Court has framed the issue in such a way
that, at least with regard to the electronic tracking of automobiles,
government agents may track whomever they wish, whenever they
choose, with only their own self-restraint as a check.66 As law
63 Id. at 281-82 (1983). The Court stated,
When Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was
traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact
of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination
when he exited from public roads onto private property.
Id.
64 See, e.g., id. at 282 ("Visual surveillance from public places ... would have
sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police. The fact that the officers in this
case relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the use of... [a tracking
device] does not alter the situation."); United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753,
759 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("The decisive issue... is not what the officers saw, but
what they could have seen.").
65 See, e.g., id.
66 Id. at 278 (describing officers who, without attempting to secure a warrant,
arranged for a retailer to sell a tracking device-equipped product to their
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enforcement personnel are not required to obtain search warrants
before doing so, the potential for abuse is great. The most obvious
solution to this problem is for the Supreme Court to rework its
current inadequate interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
67
As insightful as it was in 1967, Justice Harlan's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test is woefully outdated.
While the principle of stare decisis is vital in preserving a stable,
predictable judicial system, 68 the doctrine "is not an inexorable
command .... ,,69 Rather, "when governing decisions are
unworkable... '[the Supreme] Court has never felt constrained to
follow precedent.' 70 Discussing the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment,
as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials. 71 Indeed, the current interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment offers no protection from the potentially
arbitrary decisions of law enforcement agents to commence
electronic tracking. Additionally, the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard, which depends heavily on the pervasiveness of
technology, is no longer useful.72 In a society in which advances
in surveillance technology are made with disconcerting frequency,
it seems naYve to have any substantial expectation of privacy.73
suspect); see also People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at * 1
(N.Y. Co. Ct. May 6, 2004) (describing an officer who, after determining that
electronic tracking was necessary, merely obtained permission from his superior
before engaging in such tracking).
67 See Waseem Karim, The Privacy Implications of Personal Locators: Why
You Should Think Twice Before Voluntarily Availing Yourself to GPS
Monitoring, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 485, 511 (2004).
68 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.").6 9 Id. at 828.
7°Id. at 827 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
71 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967).
72 Karim, supra note 67, at 511.
73 See Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 11 ("Scarcely a month goes by in which
we don't read about some new high-tech way to invade people's privacy, from
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 6
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Moreover, it would appear that, theoretically, the government
could make it impossible to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy if it "announced flatly that it would conduct...
surveillance." 74 At least with regard to modem technology, the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test causes the Fourth
Amendment to fail in its most basic purpose. As it seems clear that
the standard is "unworkable," it is time for the Supreme Court to
address the shortcomings inherent in its current interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a new
reading of the Fourth Amendment's protections. While those who
endeavor to formulate alternative interpretations recommend
different approaches, one conclusion seems constant in Fourth
Amendment scholarship: The "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard is no longer applicable.75 Viable alternatives to the
current reading of the Fourth Amendment include standards that
focus on government accountability76 or even, perhaps, one based
on the principle of fundamental fairness. United States v. Forest,
77
discussed above, provides a clear example of the intrinsic dangers
of using the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as the
foundation of our Fourth Amendment protections. In Forest, DEA
agents obtained a suspect's "cell site data" from his cellular service
provider and used this information to determine the suspect's
location and, in turn, arrest him.78 The DEA officers did not obtain
a warrant specifically authorizing them to conduct any of these
face recognition to implantable microchips, data-mining, DNA chips, and even
'brain wave fingerprinting."').
74 Karim, supra note 67, at 511.
75 See, e.g., id. ("The current Fourth Amendment 'reasonable expectation of
privacy' standard is inadequate."); Alexander T. Nguyen, Here's Looking at
You, Kid: Has Face Recognition Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth
Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 3 (2002) at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol7/issuel/v7il_a02-Nguyen.PDF ("[T]he 'reasonable
expectation of privacy' doctrine outlined in Katz has outlived its usefulness and
is helpless against face recognition software in public.").
76 See Nguyen, supra note 75, 21-22 (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment
may be read as limiting the power of the government, rather than simply
protecting the rights of individuals).
77 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
78 Id. at 947-48.
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activities. 79 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that, under the current interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, the triangulation technique used by police did not
constitute a "search" at all; Garner was traveling on a public
highway and thus had no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
his whereabouts.8 0 Forest was only recently denied certiorari by
the Supreme Court. While Forest may not have been the optimal
case for reforming privacy law, by denying certiorari, the Supreme
Court missed an opportunity to constrain the government's ability
to track people at will. While society waits for the Supreme Court
to take action on this matter, lower courts can safeguard privacy by
requiring law enforcement officers to obtain warrants prior to
engaging in electronic tracking of any kind.
As noted above, courts have generally not regarded
electronic tracking as a "search." Therefore, government actors
interested in conducting such surveillance are not burdened by the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. However, recent cases
suggest that various state courts are rebelling against the traditional
Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. For
example, in State v. Jackson82 the Washington Supreme Court held
that police must obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS device on
a citizen's vehicle.8 3 In coming to this conclusion, the court broke
79See id. at 947. "[T]he DEA obtained district court authorization to intercept
communications over Garner's cellular phone... [and to force Sprint] to
disclose to the government all subscriber information, toll records, and other
information relevant to the government's investigation." While the district
court's order allowed agents to seize information related to calls that Garner (the
suspect) made, it did not allow the DEA to force Garner's phone to contact
cellular towers and, in turn, reveal the suspect's location. These actions allow
the government to turn any cellular phone into a makeshift tracking device.80 Id. at 950-51 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
81 Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004) cert. denied, Forest v. United States, No.
03-10899, 2004 WL 2168984 (S. Ct. Oct. 4, 2004). The Supreme Court did not
provide any indication as to why this case was denied certiorari or about the type
of case that might better serve as a means of reworking the Fourth Amendment's
protections.
82 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003).
83 See id. at 224 ("We conclude that citizens of this State have a right to be free
from the type of governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS device is
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 6
with the longstanding principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
Knotts. The Washington court held that the use of GPS devices
replaced, rather than augmented, the natural senses of law
enforcement officers,84 dismissing the argument that the use of
tracking devices is similar to the execution of visual surveillance.
The court solidified this argument by pointing out that, by
examining the information recorded by certain types of GPS
devices, government agents could effectively look into the past, a
feat that no visual surveillance team could accomplish. 85 In
essence, the court found the tracking to be such an "intrusive
method of surveillance" that it must not be conducted without a
warrant.
86
A New York court reached a similar conclusion in People
v. Lacey,87 where police used GPS technology to apprehend a
burglary suspect. In Lacey, police officers in Nassau County,
New York responded to a failed burglary attempt in which the
victim chased off the would-be offender, who drove away in a
black Mitsubishi. 89 Two witnesses reported the Mitsubishi's
license plate number to police, who used this information to locate
the vehicle.90 After obtaining permission from a higher-ranking
officer, the investigating detective placed a GPS device on the
Mitsubishi and monitored its movements over the next several
weeks. 91 The police tracked the Mitsubishi to the scene of another
burglary, where they apprehended its driver, Richard Lacey.92 The
Lacey court held that "in the absence of exigent circumstances, not
here present, the police should have obtained a warrant prior to
attached to a citizen's vehicle, regardless of reduced privacy expectations due to
advances in technology.").
84 Id. at 223 ("We perceive a difference between the kind of uninterrupted, 24-
hour a day surveillance possible through use of a GPS device... and an officer's
use of binoculars or a flashlight to augment his or her senses.").
85 Id. at 223 n.2 ("Sense enhancement devices like binoculars and flashlights do
not enable officers to determine what occurred in the past.").86 Id. at 224.
87 No. 2463N/02 2004 WL 1040676 (N.Y. Co. Ct. May 6, 2004).
88 Id. at * 1.
89 Id.
90 Id. at * 1-2.
91 Id. at *2.
92 Id. at *2-3.
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attaching the GPS to the... [defendant's car]." 93 The court based
this finding on its beliefs that "a person must feel secure that his or
her every movement will not be tracked except upon a warrant
based on probable cause"94 and that "technology cannot abrogate
our constitutional protections." 95 Indeed, the Lacey decision
deserves judicial attention because the court based its decision on
relevant case law from across the nation. 96 Moreover, while Lacey
did not involve a manufacturer-installed GPS, such as OnStar, the
court implied that a warrant requirement would apply in those
cases as well.
97
Finally, state courts have not limited their intervention to
cases involving the GPS. In State v. Campbell,98 Oregon police
officers used a radio transmitter, similar to the "beeper" used in
Knotts, to track a suspect. Instead of verifying the prudence of this
tactic by first obtaining a search warrant, the officers decided to
follow "in-house" criteria commonly used by the Washington
County Sheriff's Office. 99 The Oregon Supreme Court held,
[U]se of a radio transmitter to locate an object to
which the transmitter is attached cannot be equated
with visual tracking. Any device that enables the
police quickly to locate a person or object anywhere
within a 40-mile radius, day or night, over a period
of several days, is a significant limitation on
freedom from scrutiny.'00
Moreover, the Campbell court was outwardly hostile to the
traditional view that surveillance conducted in public does not
" Id. at *8.
94 Id.
951d.
96 See id. at *3-8.
97 See id. at *8 n.2 ("This opinion does not address manufacturer installed GPS
devices on automobiles. However, in the absence of exigent circumstances the
prudent course for law enforcement would be to obtain a warrant prior to
tracking such [sic] device.").
98 State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1998).
99 See id. at 1041. The Sheriff's Office's "criteria" included whether the officers
have reason to believe that the person to be tracked "is active in whatever
criminal activity ... [the officers are] trying to investigate" and whether the
officers have tried tracking the suspect using standard visual surveillance.
'
00 Id. at 1048 (internal citations omitted).
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constitute a search.' 0' The court held that the use of a radio
transmitter as a tracking device constituted a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment and that police must obtain a warrant before
engaging in such activity.l°2 The tracking methods made possible
by the newer technology in cellular phones, ETC systems, and
GPS navigators provide greater opportunity for tracking than the
older, less precise radio transmitter at issue in Campbell. Since
even the tracking device used by the police in Campbell was so
intrusive that its use required a warrant, it would seem that courts
should apply the same restriction upon searches using the more
invasive capabilities of these newer devices.
While the Supreme Court should carefully consider the
reasoning presented in cases such as Jackson, Lacey, and
Campbell, there is an alternative means of keeping government
agents from using privately owned property as a means of tracking
the owners of that property. This alternative involves a hybrid of
contract law and public policy arguments. In order to receive
services from the cellular phone providers, companies offering in-
vehicle GPS, or electronic toll collection services, consumers must
agree to the contractual terms offered by the seller. Invariably,
agreements of this type include a "privacy" or "non-disclosure"
policy that explains how the offeror-company might use the
personal information of its subscribers.' ° 3 For instance, Sprint's
cellular phone privacy policy states,
101 Id. at 1049 (where the court held that, under such an interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment's protections, "no movement, no location and no
conversation in a 'public place' would in any measure be secure from the prying
of the government. There would in addition be no ready means for individuals
to ascertain when they were being scrutinized and when they were not. That is
nothing short of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom.").
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., E-ZPass New Jersey Customer Service Center, E-ZPass Customer
Agreement Terms and Conditions, at
http://www.ezpass.com/static/terrns/i-terms.pdf (Sept. 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); OnStar, OnStar Terms and
Conditions, at
http://www.onstar.com/us english/jsp/gltermsprivacy.j sp?page=glterms.jsp
(July 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology);
Sprint PCS, Terms and Conditions, at
http://www.sprintpcs.com/common/popups/popLegalTermsPrivacy.html (last
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It is Sprint PCS's policy to respect the privacy of its
members. Sprint PCS will not monitor, edit or
disclose any personal information about you or your
use of the Service, including its contents, without
your permission unless Sprint PCS has a good faith
belief that such action is necessary to: 1.) conform
to legal requirements or comply with legal process;
Service contracts uniformly include terms allowing providers to
release subscribers' personal information when such release is
required by law.' 0 5 Under a tenet of contract law so fundamental
that it is recognized in every state, the terms of a contract must be
both clear and definite.10 6 The "unless required by law" provisions
in the service agreements described above are neither clear nor
definite.
While it would be a stretch of the imagination to think that
most people actually read the lengthy contracts 10 7 for cellular
service, GPS service, etc., it would take an even greater logical
leap to believe that the average consumer understands the
implications inherent in phrases such as "unless required by law."
Under the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the
phrase translates into something roughly as follows: "Law
enforcement agents can attain your personal information whenever
they see fit, regardless of whether or not they have first obtained a
warrant." Consumers are actually giving up much more privacy
visited Nov. 30, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
104 Sprint, supra note 103 (emphasis added).
105See, e.g., E-ZPass, supra note 103 ("Customer account information will not
be disclosed to third parties without your consent except as permissible by law.);
OnStar, supra note 103 ("You consent to OnStar's use of your information to (i)
provide and improve Services, (ii) enforce these Terms and Conditions, (iii)
prevent fraud and respond to regulatory and legal requirements and valid court
orders.") (emphasis added).
106 See, e.g., Snug Harbor Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Curran, 284 S.E.2d 752, 755
(N.C. App. 1981) ("The terms of a contract must be sufficiently definite that a
court can enforce them.").
107 The Sprint PCS Terms and Conditions, when printed out, consist of twenty
pages of legal jargon. The OnStar Terms and Conditions fill fewer pages, but
with significantly more text per page.
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than they realize. This fundamental misunderstanding of the terms
of these privacy policies suggests that the contracting parties did
not mutually assent to their respective service agreements. 08 This
paper does not propose that all existing cellular phone and GPS
service contracts be invalidated and, in fact, recognizes that lack of
assent to a collateral matter, which the privacy provision of a
service agreement is likely to be considered, rarely causes a
contract to be invalidated. 0 9 However, if courts recognize that the
average person who enters into such a contract has no way of
knowing that their new purchases render them vulnerable to
unbridled and potentially arbitrary government tracking, such a
court must also recognize that these consumers had the reasonable
expectation that their private property would not be used against
them. Since users of such technology exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to that property, the Fourth
Amendment requires law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant
before using such property for tracking purposes.
V. Conclusion
It would be foolish to suggest that law enforcement's use of
tracking technology is always detrimental to society. On the
contrary, electronic devices have the potential to help police
investigations become both more efficient and more effective. By
using devices such as GPS locators, police can be more successful
in conducting investigations and fouling criminal activity.
However, while such technology provides better surveillance
108 See, e.g., Lamb v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 411 S.E.2d 527, 529 (Ga.
App. 1991) ("[T]o form a valid contract there must be... mutual assent by all
parties to all terms."); Sprinkle v. Ponder, 64 S.E.2d 171, 177 (N.C. 1951) ("To
constitute a valid contract the parties must assent to the same thing in the same
sense.").
'09 See, e.g., Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 515 N.E.2d
61, 65 (Ill. 1987) (holding "[t]he essential terms of a contract must be definite
and certain in order for a contract to be enforceable.") (emphasis added); Witt v.
Realist, Inc., 118 N.W.2d 85, 93 (Wis. 1962) ("To be enforceable a contract
must be definite and certain as to its basic terms and requirements. It must spell
out the essential commitments and the obligations of each party with reasonable
certainty.").
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opportunities, it simultaneously creates a great potential for abuse.
Indeed, the potential for abuse will grow in proportion to the power
of the technology.
The technological advances that characterize our society
are not going to cease. Companies will continue to develop more
effective surveillance devices, and unless the nation's courts
resolve to limit the power of law enforcement to use this
technology to track us, our right to privacy will fade into
nonexistence. However, the judiciary has the power to defend our
privacy. By requiring government agents to obtain warrants prior
to conducting electronic tracking or, alternatively, reforming the
current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's protections, the
courts can block the advance of arbitrary government surveillance.
In 1948, the Supreme Court held that the test balancing an
individual's privacy against the government's right to conduct
searches must "as a rule ... be decided by a judicial officer, not by
a policeman or government enforcement agent."" 0 Unfortunately,
this insight was abandoned by subsequent incarnations of the
Court, and our privacy interests have suffered as a result. "It's not
Big Brother yet," says lawyer Alan Dershowitz, "but it's Big Third
Cousin."11' The judiciary should take heed, lest the rest of the
family arrive.
"0 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
' Sam Allis, Change, Your Ways, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2003, at A2.
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